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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 












Washington County Public Defenders Office 
383 Broadway 
Fort Edward, New York 12828 
July 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months. 
Davis, Berliner 
Appellant's Brief received August 26, 2020 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
· ndersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
·-
----"~-=~0....- .._b-*f'ttl'Tiiie~· - _-_- Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~firmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to-- --
/ 
Affirm ed _ Vacated, remanded fo r de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board.'s determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Irunate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on__.._~~~-~ 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) . 
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   Appellant challenges the July 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 
24-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense is for drinking at least several beers and then driving a 
car, crossing the yellow line, and striking two people, which caused the death of one of them. 
Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational 
bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required 
statutory factors. 2) the Board ignored his EEC. 3) the Board violated his due process legitimate 
expectation of early release. 4) the decision was predetermined. 5) the decision was due to bias. 6) 
the decision illegally resentenced him. 7) the Board didn’t have his sentencing minutes. 8) the 
decision is based upon erroneous information in that alcohol played no role in the crime. 9) the 
Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the COMPAS was 
ignored, and the statutes are now forward and rehabilitation based. 
 
   Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the 
specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  
People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a 
finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the 
welfare of society. Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 
771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  While 
consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
   Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered 
other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered.  Matter 
of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Arena v. 
New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d 
Dept. 2017);  Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 
(3d Dept. 2018).   
   The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
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Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
   The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal 
behavior.  See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of 
Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 
N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 
A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).    
   The Board may cite an inmate’s prior history of irresponsible driving in its decision. Confoy v New 
York State Division of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept 1991); Wade v 
Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board may consider an inmate’s 
history of drug and/or alcohol abuse.  Matter of Espinal v. New York Bd. of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 
100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019) (substance abuse history); Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 
A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (substance abuse history and risk of future drug 
abuse); Matter of Dean v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1207, 1208, 801 N.Y.S.2d 
92, 93 (3d Dept. 2005) (involvement with weapons and drugs), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 705, 812 
N.Y.S.2d 34 (2006); Matter of Sanchez v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 
2005) (history of drug abuse); Matter of Llull v. Travis, 287 A.D.2d 845, 846, 731 N.Y.S.2d 405, 
406 (3d Dept. 2001) (drug abuse); Matter of Brant v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 236 A.D.2d 
760, 761, 654 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (3d Dept. 1997) (history of alcohol and drug abuse); Matter of 
McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994) 
(history of alcohol abuse); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 
468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983) (drug addiction); Matter of Maciag v. Hammock, 88 A.D.2d 
1106, 453 N.Y.S.2d 56 (3d Dept. 1982) (problem of alcohol and drug abuse with the concomitant 
need for programmed counseling).  
   The Board may consider the inmate’s limited expression of remorse. Beodeker v Stanford, 164 
A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018). “[T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in 
the statute that may be given effect by considering remorse and insight.”  Matter of Silmon v. 
Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000).  Insight and remorse are relevant not only 
to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the offense.  
Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007). 
   The Board may consider the potential danger an inmate would pose to the community if the inmate 
were to be released Bridget v Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept 2002) or that the 
inmate would place the public at risk. Valerio v Dennison, 35 A.D.3d 938, 825 N.Y.S.2d 574 (3d 
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Dept. 2006); Arena v New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 156 
A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Constant v Stanford, 157 A.D.3d 1175, 67 N.Y.S.3d 
508 (3d Dept. 2018). 
    Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole.  Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 
1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 
2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 
(3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). An EEC does not 
automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. 
Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the Board is not 
required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 
817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may deny release 
to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the 
inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not 
compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. 
Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). The Board acted within its discretion in determining other considerations 
rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this 
time.   See generally Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Neal v. 
Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Singh v. Evans, 107 
A.D.3d 1274, 1275, 968 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649-50 (3d Dept. 2013).   
   There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000). There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
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2000). Nor was any penal philosophy discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption 
that the Board complied with its duty. See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 
A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). 
 
   There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed 
from such bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 
2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of 
Grune v. Board of Parole,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). 
 
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of 
a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New 
York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create 
a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-
76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of 
Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). Parole release is a statutory grant of a restricted form of liberty prior to the 
expiration of a sentence. Johnson v Superintendent Adirondack Correctional Facility, 174 A.D.3d 
992, 106 N.Y.S.3d 408 (3d Dept. 2019). 
   There is no dispute that the Board neither had nor considered the sentencing minutes. However, 
since  the appellant’s appearance before the Board, the Appeals Unit has been able to obtain and 
review the subject’s sentencing minutes. A review of the sentencing minutes reveals that at no time 
during the proceeding did the court proffer any recommendation in favor of or in opposition to the 
appellant’s possible release to parole supervision. That the Parole Board neither had nor considered 
the sentencing minutes when they fail to contain any recommendation in favor of or in opposition to 
an inmate’s possible release to parole supervision constitutes harmless error and does not provide a 
basis for setting aside the appealed from decision. Schettino v New York State Division of Parole, 
45 A.D.3d 1086, 845 N.Y.S.2d  569 (3d Dept. 2007); Motti v Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 1114 (3d Dept. 
2007); Valerio v New York State Division of Parole, 59 A.D.3d 802, 872 N.Y.S.2d 606 (3d Dept. 
2009);  Abbas v New York State Division of Parole, 61 A.D.3d 1228, 877 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dept. 
2009); Cruz v Alexander, 67 A.D.3d 1240, 890N.Y.S.2d 656 (3d Dept. 2009); Davis v Lemons, 
73 A.D.3d 1354, 899 N.Y.S.2d 919 (3d Dept. 2010); Ruiz v New York State Division of Parole, 
70 A.D.3d 1162, 894 N.Y.S.2d 582 (3d Dept. 2010). 
    The Pre-sentence Investigation Report states appellant remembers drinking several beers before 
driving, and can’t remember much else as to what happened. Thus, the decision is not based upon 
erroneous information. Pursuant to Executive Law sections 259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-k(1), the Board 
is required to obtain official reports and may rely on the information contained therein.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 474, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706, 708 (2000) 
(discussing former status report); Matter of Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 
(3d Dept.) (presentence investigation report), lv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011); 
see also Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976). To the 
extent Appellant contends the Board relied on erroneous information in the pre-sentence report, 
this is not the proper forum to raise the issue.  Any challenge to the pre-sentence report must be 
made to the original sentencing court.  Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 
N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Wisniewski v. Michalski., 114 A.D.3d 1188, 979 
N.Y.S.2d 745 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Vigliotti v. State, 98 A.D.3d 789, 950 N.Y.S.2d 619 (3d 
Dept. 2012).  The Board is mandated to consider the report and is entitled to rely on the information 
contained in the report.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d)(7); Matter of 
Carter v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 
712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011).      
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      Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079; Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 
2019). An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. 
Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York 
State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Ward v City of 
Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).  
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Schendel v Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428 (3d Dept. 2020). 
     In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.       
    Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). 
   The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory 
factors. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); 
accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The 
Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense.  See Matter of Montane v. 
Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo 
v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 
A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent a rehabilitation/forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental 
basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, 
the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to 
“assist” the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board 
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satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 
116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. 
Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 
386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to 
be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety 
of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did 
not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by 
considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument 
cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  Rather, 
the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter 
of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); 
accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
